This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work.This work is in the public domain in (...) the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work.As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

v. 1. Essays on ethics by the Earl of Shaftesbury, Frances Hutcheson ; Samuel Butler ; Adam Smith ; Jeremy Bentham - v. 2. Essays by Samuel Clarke ; John Balguy ; Richard Price ; John Brown ; John Clarke ; Ralph Cudworth ; John Gay ; Thomas Hobbes ; Henry Home Kames ; John Locke ; John Mandeville ; William Paley ; William Wollaston.

David Hume's Treatise of Human Nature, was composed before the author was twenty-six years old, was published in 1739 and 1740. Its importance was not generally recognised at the time. Hume, attributing the failure of his Treatise to the manner of its writing rather than the matter is contained, cast the first part of that work anew in the Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, and afterwards continued the same process in the second work contained in this volume, the Enquiry concerning the (...) Principles of Morals. (shrink)

David Hume's Treatise of Human Nature, composed before the author was twenty-eight years old, was published in 1739 and 1740. In revising the late L.A. Selby-Bigge's edition of Hume's Treatise Professor Nidditch corrected verbal errors and took account of Hume's manuscript amendments. He also supplied the text of theof the Treatise following the original 1740 edition and provided an apparatus of variant readings.

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work. This work is in the public domain (...) in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work.As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of MoralsIan RossDavid Hume. An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals. Tom L. Beauchamp, editor. The Clarendon Edition of the Works of David Hume. New York: Oxford University Press, 1998.An edition of Hume's philosophic writings on rigorous, modern bibliographic principles has long been a scholarly desideratum. Readers in the many fields in which Hume's thought and style have made a profound impression have (...) basically relied on the originals or derivatives of efforts of the Victorian era. One is Hume's Philosophical Works (4 v., London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1874-75), edited by the Oxford dons, T. H. Green and T. H. Grose. Well-known for his idealist philosophy and theory of liberalism, Green contributed introductions to the first and second volumes criticizing Hume from an anti-empirical standpoint. Grose offered a "History of [Hume's] Editions" as an introduction to the third volume, and claimed to have revised Hume's text throughout. This edition has the virtue of comprehensiveness, but is deficient in its offering of variant readings. Later there came from Oxford University Press editions of the Treatise of Human Nature (1888), deemed generally sound, and the two Enquiries (1894), marred by departures from Hume's text, prepared by a prominent civil servant, Sir Lawrence Amherst Selby-Bigge, whose chief contribution was to provide useful analytical indices. An attempt at achieving higher editorial standards was made by P. H. Nidditch, Professor of Philosophy in the University of Sheffield, in a "second" edition of Selby-Bigge's Treatise (1976) and a "third" edition of his text of the Enquiries (1975). Limits were imposed by Oxford University Press, apparently unwilling to make more then small changes in the existing pages. Nidditch announced (Enquiries, 1975, at p.348, n.2) that he had a "fresh" edition in preparation, but he did not live to complete this project.In the event, the challenge to produce a critical edition of Hume's philosophical, political, and literary writings was canvassed at early meetings of the Hume Society formed in 1973. Thereafter, in 1982, a team of general editors was formed by T. L. Beauchamp, D. F. Norton, and M. A. Stewart, determined to organize and finish the task in hand, and Oxford University Press finally conceded it was time to replace Selby-Bigge. With the appearance of Tom Beauchamp's "critical edition" of the second Enquiry (hereafter identified as EPM), published on 4 August 1999, but bearing the date 1998, the long wait for a reliable text, bibliographic apparatus, and ancillary scholarship, worthy of Hume, must be declared over.If we grant that it is appropriate to introduce the new Clarendon Edition of the Works of David Hume with the piece he deemed "best," it must also be asked why he made this judgment. Philosophers have generally held that his Treatise of Human Nature (1739-40) is the most profound and searching statement of his epistemological and moral thought, but its seeming lack of immediate success with readers made Hume dissatisfied with it. Such were his negative feelings, coupled with irritation at attacks on him focused on this "juvenile" work, that he partially repudiated the Treatise at the end of his life. He wrote an "Advertisement" to this effect, and it was inserted as a preface to the authoritative and posthumous 1777 edition of his Essays and Treatises. Here he stated he was "sensible of the error of going to the press too early, and he cast the whole [of [End Page 280] the Treatise] anew in the following pieces [including EPM], where some negligences in his former reasoning and more in the expression, are, he hopes, corrected" (EPM Intro., xii-xiii, n.4).On the evidence of Beauchamp's editorial labors, it would appear that EPM is Hume's "best" work in this sense. It represents the most thorough recasting of source material provided by the Treatise. Its essential moral principles and psychological insights about the passions are retained, but "readability and elegance" are achieved by pruning, simplifying, and compacting the Treatise's complex teaching, while adding a wealth of illustrative material drawn from Hume's mature reflection on his subject and... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of MoralsIan RossDavid Hume. An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals. Tom L. Beauchamp, editor. The Clarendon Edition of the Works of David Hume. New York: Oxford University Press, 1998.An edition of Hume's philosophic writings on rigorous, modern bibliographic principles has long been a scholarly desideratum. Readers in the many fields in which Hume's thought and style have made a profound impression have (...) basically relied on the originals or derivatives of efforts of the Victorian era. One is Hume's Philosophical Works (4 v., London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1874-75), edited by the Oxford dons, T. H. Green and T. H. Grose. Well-known for his idealist philosophy and theory of liberalism, Green contributed introductions to the first and second volumes criticizing Hume from an anti-empirical standpoint. Grose offered a "History of [Hume's] Editions" as an introduction to the third volume, and claimed to have revised Hume's text throughout. This edition has the virtue of comprehensiveness, but is deficient in its offering of variant readings. Later there came from Oxford University Press editions of the Treatise of Human Nature (1888), deemed generally sound, and the two Enquiries (1894), marred by departures from Hume's text, prepared by a prominent civil servant, Sir Lawrence Amherst Selby-Bigge, whose chief contribution was to provide useful analytical indices. An attempt at achieving higher editorial standards was made by P. H. Nidditch, Professor of Philosophy in the University of Sheffield, in a "second" edition of Selby-Bigge's Treatise (1976) and a "third" edition of his text of the Enquiries (1975). Limits were imposed by Oxford University Press, apparently unwilling to make more then small changes in the existing pages. Nidditch announced (Enquiries, 1975, at p.348, n.2) that he had a "fresh" edition in preparation, but he did not live to complete this project.In the event, the challenge to produce a critical edition of Hume's philosophical, political, and literary writings was canvassed at early meetings of the Hume Society formed in 1973. Thereafter, in 1982, a team of general editors was formed by T. L. Beauchamp, D. F. Norton, and M. A. Stewart, determined to organize and finish the task in hand, and Oxford University Press finally conceded it was time to replace Selby-Bigge. With the appearance of Tom Beauchamp's "critical edition" of the second Enquiry (hereafter identified as EPM), published on 4 August 1999, but bearing the date 1998, the long wait for a reliable text, bibliographic apparatus, and ancillary scholarship, worthy of Hume, must be declared over.If we grant that it is appropriate to introduce the new Clarendon Edition of the Works of David Hume with the piece he deemed "best," it must also be asked why he made this judgment. Philosophers have generally held that his Treatise of Human Nature (1739-40) is the most profound and searching statement of his epistemological and moral thought, but its seeming lack of immediate success with readers made Hume dissatisfied with it. Such were his negative feelings, coupled with irritation at attacks on him focused on this "juvenile" work, that he partially repudiated the Treatise at the end of his life. He wrote an "Advertisement" to this effect, and it was inserted as a preface to the authoritative and posthumous 1777 edition of his Essays and Treatises. Here he stated he was "sensible of the error of going to the press too early, and he cast the whole [of [End Page 280] the Treatise] anew in the following pieces [including EPM], where some negligences in his former reasoning and more in the expression, are, he hopes, corrected" (EPM Intro., xii-xiii, n.4).On the evidence of Beauchamp's editorial labors, it would appear that EPM is Hume's "best" work in this sense. It represents the most thorough recasting of source material provided by the Treatise. Its essential moral principles and psychological insights about the passions are retained, but "readability and elegance" are achieved by pruning, simplifying, and compacting the Treatise's complex teaching, while adding a wealth of illustrative material drawn from Hume's mature reflection on his subject and... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:381 IMPRESSIONS, IDEAS, AND FICTIONS I. Introduction Under the heading of "fiction," Selby-Bigge's index to Hume's Treatise of Human Nature lists no fewer than seventeen distinct fictions. There is the fiction of perfect equality, of continued and distinct existence, of substance and matter, of substantial forms, accidents, faculties and occult qualities, the fiction of personal identity, and many others. The notion of a fiction is central in (...) Hume's philosophy. As the title of this paper suggests, I believe that fictions are so important that what is commonly called Hume's theory of impressions and ideas ought to be called the theory of impressions, ideas, and fictions. Although fictions are at the heart of a number of Treatise passages, they have 2 generally received very little sustained treatment. This paper is a start at filling a gap in Hume interpretation. I hope to lay the groundwork for a complete study of Hume's fictions. There are some obvious questions to be addressed in such a study: Is there just one type of fiction or are there many? Is there an essential feature or set of features shared by all fictions? Is the characterization of a view as involving a fiction always a criticism of that view? If fictions are in some sense false or wrong, what do they contrast with? What notions are true or correct? Does Hume's account of fictions mesh with an account of truth? If there is no account of truth, how can there be an account of fictions? These questions, by no means the only ones which can be raised, are related. They can be seen as hovering around the issue of whether Hume's notion 382 of a fiction is an ontological notion. Is calling something a fiction denying the existence of that thing? Does believing in fictions (e.g., believing that there are persons) amount to holding a false belief that something exists when in fact it does not? Should we read Hume as claiming, for example, that there are no substances because he calls substance a fiction? Answering 'yes' to these questions has obvious implications for the questions raised in the last paragraph. I believe that while the deflationist reading is not completely wrong, it is wrong enough to account for much confusion in Hume interpretation. Many readers of the Treatise think, for example, that in calling the self a fiction Hume is denying the existence of persons. This makes it completely mysterious why Hume talks about persons throughout the Treatise in a common-sense way, as if they do exist. Though I cannot investigate all the consequences of my interpretation of Hume's fictions for the numerous issues which involve fictions in the Treatise, it is my hope that clarifying Hume's notion of fiction will help shed light on those other notions, such as personal identity, which Hume calls fictions. I will offer an interpretation which attempts to locate some general features of fictions in the Treatise passages where Hume invokes them. Although there are different fictions, Hume has a core notion of fiction which is fundamentally epistemological rather than ontological. There will be space in this paper to look at only a few fictions, those which occur in or before "Of scepticism with regard to the senses." I believe, however, that the interpretation can be generalized. Finally, I will suggest how my interpretation provides answers to the above questions. 383 II. Fiction and Imagination It is tempting to think of Hume's notion of a fiction as an ontological notion because in contemporary usage, the notion of a fiction is ontologically loaded. Fictions are things we construct in our heads; they are the result of concatenating ideas in the imagination. Golden mountains and the Wicked Witch of the East are fictitious; they don't represent anything which exists. If Hume is using this notion of fiction, then he must be doing deflationary ontology. On this view, to call something a fiction is to demote it to the status of something thought up in one's imagination; it is to accord it the rank of something whose existence is not to be accepted. There is some support... (shrink)

This paper addresses a line of argument in Hume's Enquiry, Section X Part 2 -- specifically, on pp.121-222 of Selby-Bigge's edition. In September 2021 I read it for the first time in several decades, and realized that the argument is seriously flawed. Although I cannot recommend that anyone else read it in its current state, perhaps by the end of 2021 I'll be in a position upload a revised version of the paper to this site.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:76 AN UNNOTICED ERROR IN HUME'S TREATISE "...the conformity between love and hatred in the agreeableness of their sensation makes them always be excited by the same objects..." Treatise, Book II, Part II, Sec. X. This passage from Hume's A Treatise of Human Nature is taken from the first edition of 1739. It can also be found in the Everyman Edition, the editions of Selby-Bigge Mossner, and (...) Green and Grosse, without editorial comment of any kind. Yet it contains a glaring and obvious error. The most superficial reading of Book II will convince one that it is love and pride that conform in the agreeableness of their sensation they are both indirect passions that aire pleasant in feeling. On the other hand, humility and hatred share in being disagree able or unpleasant impressions. This might have been a printer's error, or Hume's own mistake, and the reason for it is not hard to find. This part of Book II was called "Of love and hatred" ; the expression "love and hatred" recurs several times throughout the whole. In ei»ther the writing of the manuscript or the type setting of the text, a habit was established. Habit, which Hume himself used to explain so much else, must here be cited as the explanation of this slip. What is more interesting is the reason why such an obvious error has gone so long unnoticed. Here an ambiguity in Hume's use of the word "object" should be noticed. It is sometimes used simply as a synonym for "thing" and this is the usage in "excited by the same objects". Hume is merely saying that love and pride have the same sorts of cause. When this cause is found in oneself it leads to pride and when in another it leads to love. This of course is connected with the fact that both these passions are aggreeable or pleasant in sensation. 77 "Object" also has a special technical use in Book II when it refers to the person towards whom the passion is directed, as in "the object of the passion". Now love and hatred do have a similar sort of object, i.e. another person, whereas the object of pride and humility is, according to Hume, always oneself. In this usage, the object of a passion is carefully distinguished by Hume from its cause. It is possible that a careless and superficial reading of this passage might lead one to think that Hume meant to say that love and hatred agree in having the same sort of object, i.e. another person. Such inattention is to be deplored, but after all, until very recently, such inattention was typical of the attitude of philosophers towards Book II 2 as a whole. D. W. D. Owen University of Stirling 1.See for instance the previous paragraph; "I have suppos'd all along, that the passions of love and pride, and those of humility and hatred are similar in their sensations, and that the two former are always agreeable, and the two latter painful." 2.Thanks are due to Mr. Roland Hall for checking the first edition on my behalf.... (shrink)

Selected and edited with comparative notes and analytical index by Raphael. The British Moralists of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries form a remarkable tradition of continuous philosophical debate, reaching its high point in the ethical writings of Hume. Many of the works included in this collection are unavailable in modern editions, and those that are available can be seen to better advantage here, in the context of their historical development. This new selection differs appreciable from its predecessor, Selby-Bigge's (...) British Moralists, in the choice of authors and excerpts, in extending the scope of the authors included, and in adding comparative notes. The analytical index enables the reader to trace influences and locate notable arguments and positions. (shrink)

In his note 'Paul Russell on Hume's "Reconciling Project"' {Mind, 1984, pp. 587-8) Professor Flew makes two criticisms of my note 'On the Naturalism of Hume's "Reconciling Project"' {Mind, 1983, pp. 593-600). They are: (1) that 'nowhere does Russell take note of the fact that Hume left us two treatments "Of Liberty and Necessity", two treatments which are at least in emphases andtone of presentation very different'; and (2) that I must be 'prepared to offer and to defend some alternative (...) reading' of the first three paragraphs of the first Enquiry discussion 'Of Liberty and Necessity' where Hume suggests that 'the wholecontroversy has hitherto turned merely upon words' {EHU, p. 81—my emphasis: this and later page references are to the Selby-Bigge editions). As regards the first criticism, I refer the reader to my second footnote where I do in fact, quite explicitly, note that Hume left us two treatments 'Of Liberty and Necessity'. In this footnote I point out that my description of Hume's arguments as compattbtltst arguments 'accords somewhat more with the "reconciling" spirit of the Enquiry than with that of the Treatise where Hume tends to identify liberty with liberty of indifference' (p. 593). Obviously in any discussion note there is limited space, and therefore I could not discuss at length complexities which were not of immediate relevance to my alternative interpretation. However, contrary to what Flew claims, I do mention that there are two treatments and that they differ in emphases and tone. (shrink)

L A Selby-Bigge’s British Moralists was first published in 1897 and for over sixty years has proved an invaluable instrument in the teaching of moral philosophy in the English-speaking world. It has been out of print for a number of years. This new presentation by the Professor of Political and Social Philosophy in the University of Glasgow is most opportune.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Hume's Moral Sentiments and the Structure of the Treatise LOUIS E. LOEB ACCORDING TO NORMAN KEMP SMITH and Thomas Hearn, Hume classified moral sentiments as direct passions.' According to Pb.II A,rdal, Hume classified the basic moral sentiments of approval and disapproval of persons as indirect passions. if either of these interpretations is correct, there is an intimate connection between Books II and 111 of Hume's Treatise. This is because (...) the direct and indirect passions (together with the will) are the subject of Book 11 and moral sentiments are discussed in Book 111. So if moral sentiments are special cases of either direct or indirect passions, the treatment of passions in Book Ii is central to the understanding of Book 111. 1 contend, on the contrary, that Hume's moral sentiments are neither direct nor indirect passions. Consequently, the connection between Books 11 and 111 of the Treatise is much less intimate than A,rdal and Hearn have recently suggested.' i. Hume's Classification of the Impressions of Reflection In the four paragraphs of II, i, I Hume provides an exhaustive "Division of the Subject"--the "subject" being "all the perceptions of the mind. ''4 Nowhere else in the Treatise is a complete "division" to be found. As A,rdal points out, such introductory chapters "are likely to be written after the bulk of the book has been completed, or at least to be carefully revised in the light of the main arguments in the book. ''~ For these reasons, there is a strong presumption that the "division" in!I, i, 1should be taken as canonical. Hume's "division" is straightforward. In the first paragraph, perceptions are divided into ideas and impressions; in the first and second paragraphs, impressions are divided into those of sensation and those of reflection; in the third paragraph, impressions of reflection are divided into the calm and the violent; in the fourth (as I am indebted to Wdham Frankena, Ronald Glossop, and Peter Jones for their most helpful comments. ' Norman Kemp Smith, The Philosophy of David Hume (New York: St. Martm'~ Press, 1966), pp. 167-168; and Thomas K. Hearn, Jr., "Ardal on the Moral Sentiments in Hume's rreattse," Phtlosophy 48 (1973):290. z Passton and Value m Hume's "Treatise" (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1966), pp. I 1, 109-133. For a discussion heavily influenced by Ardal, see Stewart R. Sutherland, "Hume on Morality and the Emotions," Phllosophwal Quarterly 26 (1976) : 14-19 especially. ' See Ardal, pp. I-5, 109-133; and Hearn, pp. 288, 292. 9 A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1888), p. 275; hereafter cited as T followed by page number. 9 Ardal, p. 94. 13951 396 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY indicated by the last sentence of the third), the violent impressions of reflection are divided into the direct and the indirect. The structure is of a genus-species sort, and none of the distinctions cut across each other: J calm i sense of beauty and deformity (T, 276), moral sentiments impressions of reflection = emotions (secondary impressions) violent = passions direct indirect desire, aversion, grief, joy, pride, humility, love, hope, fear (T, 277, 439) hatred (T, 276-277) This classification is based upon the only natural reading of paragraph three and the first sentence of paragraph four of II, i, I. I quote this material, adding my own emphasis and deleting Hume's: The reflective impressions may be divided into two kinds, viz. the calm and the violent. Of the first kind is the sense of beauty and deformity in action, composition, and external objects. Of the second are the passions of love and hatred, grief and joy, pride and humility. This division is far from being exact. The raptures of poetry and music frequently rise to the greatest height; while those other impressions, properly called passions, may decay into so soft an emotion, as to become, in a manner, imperceptible. But as in general the passions are more violent than the emotions arising from beauty and deformity, these impressions have been commonly distinguish'd from each other. The subject of the human mind being so copious and various, I shall here take... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Hume on Space (and Time) BEN MIJUSKOVIC HUME'S LABYRINTHINE ANALYSES of our ideas of space and time, textually occuring so early in the Treatise, 1clearly testify to his conviction of their central role in the physical sciences, then making such fantastic progress. Furthermore, quite early in the Treatise, Hume indicates his ambition to effect a revolution in the mental sciences comparable to the one Newton had achieved in the (...) physical disciplines, through the latter's conception of the force and effects of gravity. Accordingly, Hume regards the three principles or laws of the association of ideas as a "kind of ATTRACTION, which in the mental world will be found to have as extraordinary effects as in the natural" (T, 12-13). In pursuit of his investigations Hume commences, in the first part of the Treatise, by insisting on the principle that all our simple ideas are derived from simple impressions and that impressions always precede their correspondent ideas (T, 4, 7). This being firmly established, Hume nevertheless immediately proceeds in the very next part of the work to declare, paradoxically enough, that our ideas of space and time are complex ideas that lie beyond the nature of each and all of our simple impressions. Differently put, Hume is insisting that our ideas of space and time, unlike our idea of, say, a shade of blue, are not derived unproblematically from a precedent, simple mental impression (or physiological sensation, ~ la Locke). Thus, according to Hume, our idea of space is not sensationally given; it is not traceable to an antecedent extended impression as our idea of blue is derived from a precedent impression of blue. Hume's insistence that our conception of space is nonsensational has perplexed competent commentators on Hume. Consequently, even so able an interpreteter as Kemp Smith has been puzzled "why it was that [Hume] did not take the more easy line of allowing 'extensity' to the sensations of sight and touch. ''2 Or again, "How is it that [Hume] has not taken what would seem to be for him the easier and more obvious course, at least as regards space--the course usually taken by those who hold a sensationalist theory of knowledge--that extensity is a feature of certain of our sensations (those given through the senses of touch and sight), and in consequence sensibly imaged?" (PDH, 280). Of this simpler solution both Hobbes (Leviathan, Pt. I, 1; De Corpore, Pt. II, 7, 8) and Locke (Essay, II, 8) had availed themselves prior to Hume. Hence, Kemp Smith has found the section to be tough going indeed and has contented himself, to a great extent, in simply offering a number of historical appendices, suggesting lines of influence on Hume, through passages discovered in the works of Pierre Bayle, Nicholas de Malezieu, and Isaac Barrow. Now, without denying that Hume studied and was influenced in part by the ' A Treatise of Hurnan Nature, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford, 1888); hereafter cited as T. 2 The Philosophy of David Hume (New York, 1964), p. 277; hereafter cited as PDH. [3871 388 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY thinking of these authors (as well as by Francis Hutcheson), I wish to take up and develop in this paper a "historical" suggestion first offered by a student of Kemp Smith's, Charles Hendel; and I shall extend Hendel's point and try to argue a "theoretic" one, namely, that Hume's phenomenalism in the section devoted to space and time is derived from, and closely akin to, a form of Leibnizian idealism. In 1925, Hendel argued that Hume was directly influenced by the Leibniz-Clarke debate over the ontological and epistemological status of space and time; and he held that for Hume space and time, as appearances, were ultimately grounded in the associative power of the imagination.' Thirty years later, in a second edition, Hendel disavowed his earlier claim concerning the imagination and avoided discussion of his prior view that Hume was influenced by the Leibniz-Clarke correspondence (1963 edition, pp. 501, 503). In Hume's Philosophy of Human Nature, which first appeared in 1932 (reissued by Archon, 1967; see pp. 64-65, 67, 73, 77), John Laird also intimated that... (shrink)

This guide accompanies the following article: Nikolaj Nottelmann, ‘Belief‐Desire Explanation’. Philosophy Compass Vol/Iss : 1–10. doi: 10.1111/j.1747‐9991.2011.00446.xAuthor’s Introduction“Belief‐desire explanation” is short‐hand for a type of action explanation that appeals to a set of the agent’s mental states consisting of 1. Her desire to ψ and 2. Her belief that, were she to φ, she would promote her ψ‐ing. Here, to ψ could be to eat an ice cream, and to φ could be to walk to the ice cream vendor. Adherents (...) of belief‐desire explanation, often labelled “Humeans”, standardly assume that appeals to such belief‐desire pairs sufficiently explain many human and animal actions, and also that all actions are explainable thus, at least in so far as they are guided by the agent’s intentions. Humeans take their lead from David Hume’s famous dictum that “Reason...is only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them.” In its original context, this passage from the Treatise is naturally taken to convey the thesis that mental states subservient to epistemic rationality – such as beliefs – are never in themselves sufficient to motivate action. Thus, an appeal to an agent’s beliefs is never in itself sufficient to lay bare her motivations and explain her actions, but must be supplemented by an appeal to “passions” such as desires. Many philosophers, so‐called Anti‐Humeans, have sharply disagreed. Some have pointed to certain beliefs with alleged motivational force in isolation from desires, most commonly evaluative beliefs. Others have argued that belief‐desire psychology fails to cut up mental space in a way fruitful to action explanation. Instead, only appeals to other types of mental state will adequately explain many types of intentional action. The debate for and against Humeanism is a highly complex one, which is likely to persist along with any general interest in the theory of action explanation.Author RecommendsHume, David. A Treatise of Human Nature. 2nd ed. Edited and with an Analytical Index, by L. A. Selby‐Bigge. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978.Part III. Sect. III. of the Treatise is the classical source of the Humean view. Any in‐depth understanding of contemporary Humeanism must take it as its starting point.Stroud, Barry. Hume. London: Routledge, 1977.This is an excellent introductory text. Chap. VII treats on Humeanism and the key part of the Treatise listed above.Smith, Michael. ‘The Humean Theory of Motivation.’Mind 96.381 : 36–61.This is an authoritative modern account of Humeanism. Even if a bit imprecise in some regards, the text is lucidly written and nicely captures the structure of the debate over Humeanism.Schaefer‐Landau, Russ. Moral Realism. A Defence. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2003.Chapt. 5 contains another fine, more recent, introduction to Humeanism and the typical arguments for and against it. This introduction is particularly recommendable in virtue of its clarity and comprehensiveness.Ratcliffe, Matthew. Rethinking Commonsense Psychology. A Critique of Folk Psychology, Theory of Mind and Simulation. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007.This monograph treats on a very wide number of subjects pertaining to action explanation and harbours many highly controversial theses. Still, it is a refreshing eye‐opener re the immense complexity of the topic of action explanation and the great variety of such explanations in our folk practices. On my view Ratcliffe makes plausible the view that neither our folk practices nor our scientific practices single out a unique model of action explanation as the only appropriate one. Rather our practices of action explanation constitute a rather motley family. The consequence of this to the debates over Humeanism is obvious: The combatants must get clear on the exact models of action explanation within which they discuss the place of belief‐desire references instead of pretending to fight over action explanation in general.Gendler, Tamar Szabó. ‘Alief and Belief.’Journal of Philosophy 105 : 634–63.This paper, together with Gendler’s contemporary sister paper ‘Alief in Action ’, is an engaging proponent of the view that belief‐desire psychology and its associated practice of Human action explanations gets psychological reality radically wrong. Gendler presents a number of cases where, allegedly, relevant human actions are only explicable by appeal to a type of mental state, which Gendler dubs “alief”. Aliefs are neither beliefs nor desires; but share certain characteristics with both.Online MaterialsSample SyllabusWeek I: David Hume’s viewHume, Treatise, Part III. Sect III.Stroud: Hume, Chapt. VII.Week II: Modern HumeanismSmith, ‘The Humean Theory of Motivation’.Nottelmann, ‘Belief‐Desire Explanation’.Week III: Modern Humeanism continued: The Dialectics of the DebateSchaefer‐Landau, ‘Motivational Humeanism’.Week IV: Intention, Agency and CausationDavidson, Donald. ‘Actions, Reasons, and Causes’ & ‘Freedom to Act’, both in: Essays on Actions and Events. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980.Week V: Modern Anti‐Humeanism, The Neo‐Kantian VersionScanlon, T. M. What we Owe to Each Other. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press, 1998, Chapt. 1. ‘Reasons’.Week VI: Modern Anti‐Humeanism, The Cognitive Science VersionGendler, Tamar Szabó. ‘Alief and Belief’, supplemented with excerpts of her ‘Alief in Action ’. Mind and Language 23.5 : 552–85.Focus Questions1 Which kinds of explanation do belief‐desire explanations belong to?2 In so far as belief‐desire explanations provide causal explanation of action, how are we to understand the causal nexus between belief‐desire pairs and successful agency?3 How are we to understand the notions of belief and desire as appealed to in belief‐desire explanations? Are they even conceptually distinct from the concept of a belief‐desire explanation of human action?4 May evaluative judgments such as moral judgments motivate and/or rationalize action in isolation from accompanying distinct co‐native states of the agent?5 Are certain types of intentional action better explained with sole reference to mental states different from belief as well as desire? (shrink)

This paper concerns some claims by Hume in the Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding Section X Part II -- specifically, what he says on pp.121-122 of Selby-Bigge's edition. Today (in September 2021) I have re-read the paper for the first time in decades. I cannot recommend that anyone else now read it: my argument was seriously defective. I still think, however, that its conclusion is correct, and accordingly may eventually write a new paper on the topic.

One of the most persistent issues of contemporary moral theory is the possibility of inferring moral judgments from factual nonmoral judgments. Another way of stating this issue is to inquire into the possibility of inferring "ought-judgments" from "is-judgments." It is generally accepted that the first person to deny the possibility of this inference was David Hume. The denial is supposed to be articulated in the last paragraph of the section of A Treatise of Human Nature entitled "Moral Distinctions not derived (...) from Reason," pages 469-470 in the Selby-Bigge edition. Hereafter I shall refer to this paragraph, the "is-oughtparagraph," as (I-0). The purpose of this article is to show that in (I-0) Hume makes no such denial, and to outline the implications of this revelation. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:77 KEMP SMITH, HUME AND THE PARALLELISM BETWEEN REASON AND MORALITY In a letter to a physician written in 1734 Hume expressed a dissatisfaction with the current state of philosophy and criticism, a dissatisfaction which he said had led him to strike out on his own and "seek out some new Medium, by which Truth might be establisht." He then went on to claim success: "After much Study, & (...) Reflection on this, at last, when I was about 18 Years of Age, there seem'd to be open'd up to me a new Scene of Thought, which transported me beyond Measure, & made me, with an Ardor natural to young men, throw up every other Pleasure or Business to apply entirely to it..." The wording suggests that the new Scene of Thought was a clear revelation, but nowhere does Hume tell us what the revelation was. (A clue, perhaps, is to be found in the "Abstract," where Hume says that if anything entitles him to the name of an inventor, "it is the use he makes of 2 the principle of the association of ideas.") Kemp Smith is convinced, however, that he knows what the new Scene of Thought was. According to Kemp Smith, Hume had already discovered that morality rests on feeling alone and depends in no way on insight or evidence, and the new discovery was simply the sudden realization that belief is equally independent of these considerations. I will argue in this paper that the great difficulty in this interpretation is that in those sections of the Treatise and the second Enquiry in which Hume expounds what could be called his moral epistemology he is concerned with pointing out what he considers to be important differences between reason and taste and between understanding and morality. I am not, however, questioning the validity of Kemp Smith's naturalistic interpretation, if it is broadly construed. 78 A curiosity of Kemp Smith's exposition is his citing of passages from Hume, which at first glance anyway seem to weaken, rather than strengthen, his case for the parallelism of moral and factual judgments. I will give two examples, the first being a quotation from the Green and Grose edition of the Enquiry. That Faculty, by which we discern Truth and Falsehood, and that by which we perceive Vice and Virtue had long been confounded with each other, and all Morality was suppos'd to be built on eternal and immutable Relations, which, to every intelligent Mind, were equally invariable as any Proposition concerning Quantity or Number. But a late Philosopher [Mr. Hutcheson, added as a note] has taught us, by the most convincing Arguments, that Morality is nothing in the abstract Nature of Things, but is entirely relative to the Sentiment or mental Taste of each particular [i.e. species] of Being; in the same Manner as the distinctions of sweet and bitter, hot and cold, arise from the particular feeling of each Sense or Organ. Moral Perceptions, therefore, ought not to be class 'd with the Operations of the Understanding, but with the Tastes or Sentiments. On the next page of this book Kemp Smith refers to this passage as part of the evidence for his claim that "the view here taken of our moral judgments of approval and disapproval can be extended to our beliefs regarding matters of fact and existence, and that 'logic', morals and 'criticism' may thus be brought 4 within the scope of the same general principles." The reference to "external and immutable Relations" may have led Kemp Smith to believe that Hume's thesis in this paragraph is the contrast between demonstrative and other kinds of judgment, but the last sentence is a decisive refutation of that interpretation. Hume frequently uses the term "understanding" to refer to causal reasoning, though in this sentence he seems to be using the term in 79 the more inclusive sense that would include demonstration and relations of ideas as well. But I know of no instances in which "understanding" is restricted to what Hume calls science, i.e., demonstration. Kemp Smith also quotes from the last section of Appendix I to the second Enquiry. This passage, appearing in the Selby-Bigge... (shrink)

As a particular enthusiast for the first Enquiry, Hume’s definitive presentation of his epistemology and metaphysics ☺, I eagerly awaited the new Oxford editions for many years (from when they were initially announced under the aegis of Princeton). Although the Selby- Bigge edition of the Enquiries has done good service, most notably in its role of providing a widely agreed convention for references to Hume’s texts, I have always found it a bit strange that it should be generally (...) thought of as a relatively reliable edition - if this is so, then I think it says more about the competition than it does about the Selby-Bigge edition itself. For example. (shrink)

Here we have a new edition of Hume's Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, one that will become essential for scholars alongside the new Norton and Norton edition of Hume's Treatise. L. A. Selby-Bigge's nineteenth century edition provided a good text to nineteenth century standards—good enough for it to become the standard for many years. But times change, and we now, quite reasonably, ask for more. Beauchamp's new edition provides a text and apparatus that is a vast improvement; it will (...) surely replace Selby-Bigge's as the common reference text for scholars and students. To be sure, scholars at least will not for many years be able to do without the latter's edition: so many have come out over the years with the references to the pages of this edition, that we will still have to refer to the older edition. But students have a new and very useful edition. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Hume Studies Volume XXVI, Number 1, April 2000, pp. 179-181 A Puzzling Passage in "Why Utility Pleases" PHILLIP D. CUMMINS It could hardly be controversial that in "Why utility pleases," Section V of his Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals, Hume purports to tell his readers why utility pleases. It is not controversial that in that section he rejected the deduction of morals from self-love, that is, the thesis (...) that utility pleases because actions and policies possessing it inevitably are in the actual or perceived selfinterest of the person who approves of them. This is not to deny there are interpretive issues. Nor is it to deny that there are passages which puzzle. Here is one: This deduction of morals from self-love, or a regard to private interest, is an obvious thought, and has not arisen wholly from the wanton sallies and sportive assaults of the sceptics. To mention no others, POLYBIUS, one of the gravest and most judicious, as well as most moral writers of antiquity, has assigned this selfish origin to all our sentiments of virtue. But though the solid, practical sense of that author, and his aversion to all vain subtilties, render his authority on the present subject very considerable, yet is not this an affair to be decided by authority, and the voice of nature and experience seems plainly to oppose the selfish theory. The quotation is from the new Oxford Philosophical Texts edition of the Enquiry edited by Tom L. Beauchamp, who is also responsible for the critical Phillip D. Cummins is at the Department of Philosophy, 269 English Philosophy Building, The University of Iowa, Iowa City, IA 52242-1408, USA. e-mail: [email protected] 180 Phillip D. Cummins edition. It should be noted that the quoted version agrees with both Nidditch's revised Selby-Bigge edition and the older but still useful Hendel edition. In short, this seems to be the standard wording. Nonetheless, the passage seems both to need correction and to be easily corrected. Hume presents Polybius as a highly respected defender of the selflove theory,1 one whose "authority on the present subject" is considerable. This asserted, he adds, "yet is not this an affair to be decided by authority, and the voice of nature and experience seems plainly to oppose the selfish theory." If we contrast the actual wording of the first conjunct to "yet is this an affair to be decided by authority," which expresses a genuine question, it is obvious that the first conjunct is a rhetorical question which implies that authority should decide the issue. The prior reference to Polybius seems to imply that he is the authority in question. Since, according to Hume, Polybius endorsed the selfish theory, the first conjunct itself seems to endorse the selfish theory. However, the second conjunct explicitly and directly challenges that very theory by asserting that both nature and experience oppose it. Thus, in the same sentential unit an appeal to authority is first endorsed, though it is in opposition to Hume's subsequent position, then rejected, as one would expect it to be, given that position. At worst there is inconsistency; at best a muddle. The simple correction is to rearrange three words in the first conjunct, replacing "is not this" with "this is not." These two phrases are generally used in opposition to one another; consider, for example, "Is not this the time to celebrate?" and "This is not the time to celebrate." The former grammatically is a question but its rhetorical function is to imply that it is indeed the time to celebrate, which the latter flatly denies. Note that in the present case, "yet this is not an affair to be decided by authority, and the voice of nature and experience seems plainly to oppose the selfish theory" expresses a claim perfectly in keeping with the argument that follows. Hume will appeal to nature and experience to oppose even those important authorities who endorse the selfish theory. It might be objected that my proposed correction is not needed because sense can be made of the key sentential unit, "yet... theory," as it stands. It might be argued that in the first... (shrink)

The reappearance of Professor Alasdair MacIntyre's far-ranging and provocative article, ‘Hume on “is” and “ought”’, is the proximate cause of this short excursion to an old, well-scarred, and still fascinating battleground. Re-reading MacIntyre's brilliant offensive thrust led me to review the counter-attacks and diversionary movements that followed its first appearance. They in turn sent me back, inevitably and ultimately, to look again at the cause of this philosophic skirmishing: Section 1 of Part i of Book III of Hume's Treatise of (...) Human Nature, entitled ‘Moral Distinctions not deriv'd from Reason’. The battles of the past have been waged chiefly round the last paragraph of this Section (pp. 469–470 in Selby-Bigge's edition), but my primary concern here is going to be with those ‘reasonings’ that precede the celebrated ‘is-ought’ paragraph. Closer attention to the bulk of Book III, Part i, Section 1, to which ‘reasonings’ Hume says he ‘cannot forbear adding … an observation’ on ‘is’ and ‘ought’, and some selective attention as well to Books I and II of the Treatise, should help to scale down the exaggerated importance attached to the ‘is-ought’ passage. Unless this is done, one runs the risk of permitting a tailpiece to wag the body of the chapter, if not the whole Book ‘Of Morals’. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:INCONSISTENCY WITHIN A RECONCILING PROJECT There is nothing I wou'd more willingly lay hold of, than an opportunity of confessing my errors; and shou'd esteem such a return to truth and reason to be more honourable than the most unerring judgment. Hume's words in the first sentence of its Appendix referred to Books I and II of A Treatise of Human Nature. I quote them here with a similarly (...) particular but less glorious reference to Chapter VIII of my Hume's Philosophy of Belief (London, and New York: Routledge and Kegan Paul, and Philosophical Library, 19 61). The errors to be corrected are in the first instance mine. But, if I am now right, they are also and more importantly to be found in the first Inquiry itself. Hume's purpose in Section VIII is to apply to the long disputed question concerning liberty and necessity what he takes to be his discovery that Our idea... of necessity and causation arises entirely from the uniformity observable in the operations of nature, where similar objects are constantly conjoined together, and the mind is determined by custom to infer the one from the appearance of the other. These two circumstances form the whole of that necessity, which we ascribe to matter (Selby-Bigge, EHU 81-82). In urging what is here offered as the new and only correct interpretation of what others want to distinguish as contingent necessity and contingent impossibility, Hume is in their - and my - terms saying that there is no genuine idea of, and no such thing as, contingent necessity and contingent impossibility. There are, that is to say, no true logically contingent propositions asserting certain necessities and impossibilities whether relative or absolute. There are, on the contrary, only logical necessities and logical impossibilities; and these obtain simply as relations of ideas. They do not and cannot either characterize or determine real existence and matter of fact (EHU 25-26). Now certainly, if Hume were right in maintaining either that we cannot coherently assert, or that we never have due warrant for asserting, that any causes necessitate their effects - that they make these, that is, as a matter of fact inevitable and anything else as a matter of fact impossible - then it would become a short and easy task to effect a Compatibilist resolution of the long disputed question. For, on this assumption, nothing more than profound regularities of human behaviour, and sometimes predictabilities, ever have been or ever could be revealed, whether in the everyday experience of the banausic vulgar, or whether by the elevated investigations of the physical and the human sciences. Discoveries of this sort, however, do not and cannot prejudice the familiar realities of human action; which just requires that, in some sense, agents must always be able to do otherwise than they do. This sense - a sense which allows that both the agent who acts freely and the agent who acts under compulsion act - Hume explicates as Locke had done before him in the great chapter 'Of Power' (Essay, II (xxi) 7 ff.). Action necessarily involves a power of acting or not acting, according to the determinations of the will; that is, if we choose to remain at rest, we may; if we choose to move, we also may (EHU 95). 1. Having thus in Part I drawn Compatibilist conclusions from what is in effect his rejection of all contingent necessity and contingent impossibility, Hume proceeds in Part II to apply his findings to the theological special case: to the equally long disputed question of freewill and predestination, that is, rather than of freewill and determinism. After first considering that all reward and punishment must presuppose that the persons to be so treated are the causes of whatever it is for which they are to be rewarded or punished, Hume entertains what ironically he presents as an objection to this theory, with regard to necessity and liberty... It may be said, for instance, that, if voluntary actions be subjected to the same laws of necessity with the operations of matter, there is a continued chain of necessary causes, pre-ordained and pre-determined, reaching from the original cause of all to... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:53. AN INDEX OF HUME'S REFERENCES IN A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE The index below of Hume's references in the Treatise te the works of other authors excludes those which are accurate and full in his text (of which there are few) and those which are so general, e.g., to Spinoza's atheism, that no passage is specifiable. Hume mentions other writings, for which this index is compiled, in several (...) different ways. Occasionally he mentions the author's name, the title of his book and gives a reference which is less specific than it could be. These have been identified. Often he mentions an author's name only, e.g., de Retz, and in such cases the fullest possible reference has been given. One of Hume's notable intellectual gifts was his ability to distil several pages of a book into one or two sentences of crisp and accurate synthesis. (This skill is most apparent in his summaries of articles in Bayle' s Dictionary in his "Notes on Philosophy", of which the manuscript is in the Royal Society of Edinburgh Library.) In these instances, page references are impossible and the closest indication one can give is a section or chapter. Some of his references are anonymous, e.g., as an 'elegant writer' says, and so are some quotations. These have been identified with one exception. One anonymous reference (number 24 below) requires explanation because it is both anachronistic and interesting. Hume refers to an observation by "a late eminent philosopher". It is anachronistic because the book to which he refers was published after the Treatise; it is interesting because it provides further evidence of Hutcheson's influence on Hume and the latter' s regard for him. The explanation, for Hutcheson was still alive when Vol.11 of the Treatise appeared in 1739, is that 'late' is here being used in the sense of 'recent' - Hutcheson himself uses the word in the same way in referring to Mandeville when the latter was 54. alive. (An enquiry concerning moral good and evil. Section 1, VI.) Further, the System circulated widely among Hutcheson's friends in Scotland and over so many years that it finally appeared posthumously. That Hume could not cite a published work also accounts for the anonymity of the reference to someone he admired. It is often impossible to determine in which language or in which edition Hume read a particular author. Where there is evidence as to which language he used, the title has been given in that language. There are now so many extant editions of the Treatise that Volume, Part, Chapter and Section references are given, as well as the pagination of Selby-Bigge' s edition, so that readers of other editions may be able to use the index. 1.Vol. 1. Title-page. Tacitus, The Histories, Bk. I. 1. 2.Part 1, Sect. 1, p. 2, n. John Locke, An Essay concerning Human Understanding, Bk. I, Chap. I, 8. 3.Sect. VII, p. 17, n. George Berkeley, A Treatise concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge, Introductixi, Sect. 7, e_t seq. 4.Part II, Sect. II, p. 30, n. Nicolas de Malezieu, Elementa Geometrica. 5.Sect. Ill, p. 35, n. John Locke, Essay, Bk. II, Chap. XIV. 6.Sect. IV, p. 43, n. Antoine Arnauld, La logique ou l'art de penser. Part I, Chap. 5. (In some editions Pierre Nicole is named as co-author. The book is also known as the Port Royal Logic). 7.Sect. IV, p. 46, n. Isaac Barrow, Mathematical Lectures. 8.Part III, Sect. Ill, p. 80, n. Thomas Hobbes, Elements of Philosophy, Part Second, Chap. 9. And Tripos : in Three Discourse. Ill, of Liberty and Necessity. 55. Sect. Ill, p. 80, n. e.g., Samuel Clarke, A Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God, Props. I-III, et. seq. 10.Sect. Ill, p. 81, n. John Locke, Essay, Bk. IV, Chap. X. 11.Sect. VIII, p. 100 and appendix Vol. Ill, p. 630. Cicero, De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum, Bk. V. 1.2. 12.Sect. XIII, p. 153. Jean Francois Paul de Gondi, Cardinal de Retz, Mémoires, Bk. III. The second 'observation' is from Book... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:73. More Hume autograph marginalia in a first edition of the "Treatise". Two sets of marginalia by Hume in copies of the first edition of A Treatise of Human Nature have been published. One is a copy in the British Library. This has 1 2 been described by Connon and Nidditch and was, no doubt, one, at least, of the copies which Hume kept for himself. The marginalia are (...) so extensive as to suggest that, at the time he made them, he may have been hoping for an opportunity to publish a second edition of the Treatise. The other copy with marginalia, a presentation copy to his kinsman, Henry Home, Lord Karnes, has been described by Wallace Nethery, Librarian of the Hóose Library of Phil3 osophy and by Nidditch. There is a third copy of the Treatise with marginalia in Hume's hand which was a pre4 sentation copy to Pope. The Pope copy is inscribed on the flyleaf of Volume I in Hume's handwriting, "To Alexander* Rope Esq at Twickenham". There are 18 corrections in Volume I and 5 in Volume II. They are as follows, the first word or phrase being the error, the second the correction. The first word is usually scratched out in the text and the correction inserted in the margin but sometimes insertions are simply made within the text. 1st EditionSelby-Bigge 1.12.252.8'the' Our' 1.35.2316.1'of 'or' 1.57.428.18'these* 'those' 1.58.829.6'part' 'parts' 1.111.2860.27'defection' 'dissection' 1.126.569.14'it' deleted 1.154.486.1'worn out' "worn it out' 1.240.7136.9'as' 'when' 1.256.21145.28'evidence' 'testimony' 74. ï. 273. 20155.24'instance' 'instances' 1.280.16159.33'gave it's' 'gave it its' Ï.286.25163.22-23'upon observation' 'upon the observation' 1.287.16164.2'cause' 'case' 1.288.5164.15'results* 'result' 1.293.10167.14'exists' 'exist' 1.343.17196.22'opening I' 'opening it I' 1.402.16231.6'presses' 'press' 1.453.1260.34'what the' 'what is the' 11.108.10 336.24 "affections wheel' 'affections to wheel' II. 120. 4 343.19 'cause' 'causes' 11.228.23404.15 'One' Our' 11.229.19 404.32 'and proceed' 'and practice proceed' 11.271.24428. 20 'considerably' 'sensibly' In addition, someone, perhaps Hume, has marked a printer's error where a letter has slipped. (Vol. I, p. 466. 3). It is not possible to find out the date upon which Hume gave this copy to Pope from the published correspondence of either party. Pope died in 1744 and Hume may have sent him a copy of the Treatise because of the former's literary renown and because the publishers had a large number of unsold copies on their hands. From the fact, among others, that the footnote on Volume II, p. 168 (Selby-Bigge, p. 371) is missing from both the Pope1 and the Karnes copies, it is clear that Volumes I and II were, as one might expect of presentations, in each case early issues or states. It is more than likely that Hume made other presents of the Treatise to friends and people he admired such as Francis Hutcheson and Bishop Butler, and these 75. would probably have included marginalia along the same lines as the Karnes and Pope copies. For what Hume substantially did in giving these copies was to perform an act of courtesy; i.e., to incorporate items from the errata tables into the text. The Pope copy is the least important and interesting of those noticed so far, for it contains only one correction which is not included in the errata tables - the second item listed above in Volume I - and not all of them. The percentage of the changes called for in the errata tables which are made by Hume in the text diminishes markedly as between Volumes I and II. Moreover, there are no marginalia in the third volume, 'Of Morals', and this is perhaps to be explained by Hume's becoming bored with this somewhat superfluous task, even if it was a politeness and the fact... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:73. More Hume autograph marginalia in a first edition of the "Treatise". Two sets of marginalia by Hume in copies of the first edition of A Treatise of Human Nature have been published. One is a copy in the British Library. This has 1 2 been described by Connon and Nidditch and was, no doubt, one, at least, of the copies which Hume kept for himself. The marginalia are (...) so extensive as to suggest that, at the time he made them, he may have been hoping for an opportunity to publish a second edition of the Treatise. The other copy with marginalia, a presentation copy to his kinsman, Henry Home, Lord Karnes, has been described by Wallace Nethery, Librarian of the Hóose Library of Phil3 osophy and by Nidditch. There is a third copy of the Treatise with marginalia in Hume's hand which was a pre4 sentation copy to Pope. The Pope copy is inscribed on the flyleaf of Volume I in Hume's handwriting, "To Alexander* Rope Esq at Twickenham". There are 18 corrections in Volume I and 5 in Volume II. They are as follows, the first word or phrase being the error, the second the correction. The first word is usually scratched out in the text and the correction inserted in the margin but sometimes insertions are simply made within the text. 1st EditionSelby-Bigge 1.12.252.8'the' Our' 1.35.2316.1'of 'or' 1.57.428.18'these* 'those' 1.58.829.6'part' 'parts' 1.111.2860.27'defection' 'dissection' 1.126.569.14'it' deleted 1.154.486.1'worn out' "worn it out' 1.240.7136.9'as' 'when' 1.256.21145.28'evidence' 'testimony' 74. ï. 273. 20155.24'instance' 'instances' 1.280.16159.33'gave it's' 'gave it its' Ï.286.25163.22-23'upon observation' 'upon the observation' 1.287.16164.2'cause' 'case' 1.288.5164.15'results* 'result' 1.293.10167.14'exists' 'exist' 1.343.17196.22'opening I' 'opening it I' 1.402.16231.6'presses' 'press' 1.453.1260.34'what the' 'what is the' 11.108.10 336.24 "affections wheel' 'affections to wheel' II. 120. 4 343.19 'cause' 'causes' 11.228.23404.15 'One' Our' 11.229.19 404.32 'and proceed' 'and practice proceed' 11.271.24428. 20 'considerably' 'sensibly' In addition, someone, perhaps Hume, has marked a printer's error where a letter has slipped. (Vol. I, p. 466. 3). It is not possible to find out the date upon which Hume gave this copy to Pope from the published correspondence of either party. Pope died in 1744 and Hume may have sent him a copy of the Treatise because of the former's literary renown and because the publishers had a large number of unsold copies on their hands. From the fact, among others, that the footnote on Volume II, p. 168 (Selby-Bigge, p. 371) is missing from both the Pope1 and the Karnes copies, it is clear that Volumes I and II were, as one might expect of presentations, in each case early issues or states. It is more than likely that Hume made other presents of the Treatise to friends and people he admired such as Francis Hutcheson and Bishop Butler, and these 75. would probably have included marginalia along the same lines as the Karnes and Pope copies. For what Hume substantially did in giving these copies was to perform an act of courtesy; i.e., to incorporate items from the errata tables into the text. The Pope copy is the least important and interesting of those noticed so far, for it contains only one correction which is not included in the errata tables - the second item listed above in Volume I - and not all of them. The percentage of the changes called for in the errata tables which are made by Hume in the text diminishes markedly as between Volumes I and II. Moreover, there are no marginalia in the third volume, 'Of Morals', and this is perhaps to be explained by Hume's becoming bored with this somewhat superfluous task, even if it was a politeness and the fact... (shrink)

It is a pleasure to read Hume, and to watch him explore recalcitrant problems with agility of mind and grace of style. Ironically these twin abilities have worked against each other from the beginning, in the first place because in the matter of writing Hume was an innovator — nobody before him had so successfully albeit unwittingly adapted French syntax to the writing of English-and-Scottish - and in the second place because on the grace of his style subtleties of thought (...) flow past his readers, who then accuse him of obscurity. So abstruse were his writings to his contemporaries that he failed to achieve the literary recognition for which he craved; and even today, long after the elegance of his style has been received, it is said by Passmore that Hume in contrast to Berkeley ‘was a philosophical puppy-dog, picking up and worrying one problem after another, always leaving his teeth-marks in it, but casting it aside when it threatened to become wearisome.’ Similarly Selby-Bigge says in his introduction to the Enquiries:His pages, especially those of the Treatise, are so full of matter, he says so many things in so many different ways and different connexions, and with so much indifference to what he has said before, that it is very hard to say positively that he taught, or did not teach, this or that particular doctrine. He applies the same principles to such a great variety of subjects that it is not surprising that many verbal, and some real inconsistencies can be found in his statements. He is ambitious rather than shy of saying the same thing in different ways, and at the same time he is often slovenly and indifferent about his words and formulae. This makes it easy to find all philosophies in Hume, or, by setting up one statement against another, none at all. (shrink)

It is a pleasure to read Hume, and to watch him explore recalcitrant problems with agility of mind and grace of style. Ironically these twin abilities have worked against each other from the beginning, in the first place because in the matter of writing Hume was an innovator — nobody before him had so successfully albeit unwittingly adapted French syntax to the writing of English-and-Scottish - and in the second place because on the grace of his style subtleties of thought (...) flow past his readers, who then accuse him of obscurity. So abstruse were his writings to his contemporaries that he failed to achieve the literary recognition for which he craved; and even today, long after the elegance of his style has been received, it is said by Passmore that Hume in contrast to Berkeley ‘was a philosophical puppy-dog, picking up and worrying one problem after another, always leaving his teeth-marks in it, but casting it aside when it threatened to become wearisome.’ Similarly Selby-Bigge says in his introduction to the Enquiries:His pages, especially those of the Treatise, are so full of matter, he says so many things in so many different ways and different connexions, and with so much indifference to what he has said before, that it is very hard to say positively that he taught, or did not teach, this or that particular doctrine. He applies the same principles to such a great variety of subjects that it is not surprising that many verbal, and some real inconsistencies can be found in his statements. He is ambitious rather than shy of saying the same thing in different ways, and at the same time he is often slovenly and indifferent about his words and formulae. This makes it easy to find all philosophies in Hume, or, by setting up one statement against another, none at all. (shrink)

Among the great western philosophers, David Hume enjoys at present as high and honoured a position as any, especially with the attention he has drawn in 2011, which marked the three-hundredth anniversary of his birth. The general drift of the accounts of Hume’s philosophical ideas has tended over the past few dozen years and more to be extremely positive and typically celebratory. Admirers of the man—widely regarded as the very model of the philosophical life—and of his philosophical views, are legion. (...) Hume’s works are pored over endlessly, and his interpreters generally vie with one another for the degrees of subtlety and acuity which they elaborate from those texts. At earlier times, Hume was often read and assessed much more negatively. In his own day, primary focus was on his scepticism and irreligion. Several nineteenth-century critics, including John Stuart Mill, T. H. Green, and L. A. Selby-Bigge, saw a brilliant, yet massively inconsistent, Hume. I this essay I review and discuss their criticism of Hume, from which he emerges, nonetheless, a philosophical giant. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Hume Studies Volume 28, Number 2, November 2002, pp. 319-325 A Guide to Parallel Paragraph and Page References in Oxford University Press Editions of Hume's Treatise and Abstract This guide enables readers to locate in the Oxford Philosophical Texts (OPT) edition of Hume's Treatise those book, part, section, and paragraph numbers (the universal references) that correspond to the page numbers of the edition of this work that has in (...) the past been widely cited in scholarly literature, namely, that first edited by L. A. Selby-Bigge in 1888, and revised by P. H. Nidditch in 1978 (SBN). A similar guide to the Abstract follows. The paragraphs designated in the right-hand columns begin on the SBN page designated in the left-hand columns. If a right-hand column is blank, no paragraph begins on the page designated in the left-hand column. SBN Page xiii xiv XV xvi xvii xviii xix 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Universal Reference Intro. 1-2 3 4-5 6-7 8-9 10 1.1.1.1 2-3 4-5 6-8 9-10 11 12 1.1.2.1 1.1.3.1 2-3 4 SBN Page 10 11 12 13 13 14 15 15 16 17 Universal Reference 1.1.4.1 2-3 4-6 7 1.1.5.1 2-6 7-10 1.1.6.1 2 3 1 In accordance with Hume's instructions, the OPT edition integrates into the text of Book 1 material from the Appendix found on SBN pages 627-33 and 636-9. These integrations are marked, as here, by an asterisk. SBN Page 17 18 19 20 »6371 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 Universal Reference 1.1.7.1-2 3 4-6 7 note 5 8-9 10-12 13-15 16-17 18 1.2.1.1-2 3-4 5 1.2.2.1-2 3 4-6 7-9 10 320 Guide to Oxford Edition Parallel References SBN Page 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 *637 47 48 49 50 51 *638 52 53 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 *63864 65 Universal Reference 1.2.3.1-3 4-6 7-8 9-10 11 12-15 16-17 1.2.4.1-2 3-4 5-7 8-10 11-14 15-17 18-19 20-21 22 22-24 25-26 27-29 30 31 32 33 1.2.5.1 2-3 4-5 6-9 10-12 13-15 16-18 19-20 21 22-23 24-25 26 note 12 27-28 29 SBN Page 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 78 79 80 81 82 82 83 84 84 85 *62785 86 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 94 95 Universal Reference 1.2.6.1-4 5-8 1.3.1.1 2-4 5-6 7 1.3.2.1-2 3-4 5-7 8-9 10-13 14-16 1.3.3.1 2-3 4-5 6-7 8-9 1.3.4.1 2 3 1.3.5.1-2 3 4-5 5 6-7 1.3.6.1 2-3 4 5-7 8-9 10-11 12-13 14-15 16 1.3.7.1-2 3-4 SBN Page 96 97 *628-9 97 98 99 100 *630 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 *630-2 124 125 126 127 128 Universal Reference 5 6 7 8 1.3.8.1-2 3-4 5 note 21 6 7-8 9-10 11-13 14 15 16-17 1.3.9.1 2-3 4 5-6 7-9 10 11-12 13 14 15-16 17 18-19 1.3.10.1-2 3 4-5 6 7-8 9 10-12 1.3.11.1-3 4-6... (shrink)

Because our student edition of Hume’s Treatise has appeared before publication of our critical edition of the same work, scholars using the former will find it difficult to determine how and where the text of the Treatise found there differs substantively from other editions, and from, most importantly, the widely used version of the text edited by L. A. Selby-Bigge and revised by P. H. Nidditch. Fortunately, we now have this opportunity to report the substantive differences between the (...) text found in the OPT Treatise and the text found in SBN. In addition, this report allows us to focus on many of the substantive emendations we have made to the copytext and to bring to these emendations a level of attention they might not otherwise receive. (shrink)

Over ten years ago Professor A. E. Taylor pointed out that one of the most unfortunate effects of that philosophical conquest of England by Germany in the nineteenth century was the almost complete neglect of the great line of British moralists from Cumberland to Price. Little has been done since then to remedy this defect. There is a widespread study of Bishop Butler by students in our Universities, but as regards the other members of the series, there appear no signs (...) of a renaissance. The selections of Mr. Selby-Bigge are admirable, but they serve, as all selections from the authors of a period must, to focus attention on historical similarities, not to stimulate to an examination of individual philosophies. (shrink)